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Power laws and market crashes
Empirical laws on bursting bubbles
Taisei Kaizoji
Division of Social Sciences, International Christian University,
3-10-2 Osawa, Mitaka, Tokyo, 181-8585 Japan.
In this paper, we quantitatively investigate the statistical properties of a statistical en-
semble of stock prices. We selected 1200 stocks traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and
formed a statistical ensemble of daily stock prices for each trading day in the 3-year period
from January 4, 1999 to December 28, 2001, corresponding to the period of the forming of the
internet bubble in Japn, and its bursting in the Japanese stock market. We found that the
tail of the complementary cumulative distribution function of the ensemble of stock prices in
the high value of the price is well described by a power-law distribution, P (S > x) ∼ x−α,
with an exponent that moves in the range of 1.09 < α < 1.27. Furthermore, we found that
as the power-law exponents α approached unity, the bubbles collapsed. This suggests that
Zipf’s law for stock prices is a sign that bubbles are going to burst.
§1. Introduction
In the last few decades, the stock markets has been frequently visited by large
market crashes. The increasingly frequent market crashes have attracted the atten-
tion of academics and policy makers. Numerous reports, commentaries, and aca-
demic books [1-8] have described the various reasons why stock market crashes have
occurred∗). One of the greatest myths is that market crashes are random, unpre-
dictable events. Can large market crashes be forecast? Do common warning signs
exist which characterize the end of a bubble and the start of a market crash?
My previous work [13] presents an interacting-agent model of speculative activity
explaining bubbles and crashes in stock markets. The model describes stock markets
through an infinite-range Ising model to formulate the tendency of traders getting
influenced by the investment attitude of other traders, and demonstrates that a
burst of speculative bubbles is considered qualitatively and quantitatively as the
phase transition from a bull market phase to a bear market phase.
More recently, Kaizoji and Kaizoji [14] quantitatively investigated the statistical
∗) The first econophysisist to pay a lot of attention to stock market crashes was Didier Sornette
[3]. Sornette, Johansen, and Bouchaud [9], and Feigenbaum and Freund [10] independently proposed
a theory that large stock market crashes are analogous to critical points studied in statistical physics
with log-periodic correction to scaling. Their theory predicts the existence of a log-frequency shift
over time in the log-periodic oscillations prior to a crash. Lillo and Mantegna [11,12] studied the
relaxation dynamics of a stock market just after the occurrence of a large crash by investigating
the number of times the absolute value of an index return exceeded a given threshold value. They
show that the empirical observation of a power law evolution of the number of events exceeding
the selected threshold (a behavior known as the Omori law in geophysics) is consistent with the
simultaneous occurrence of (i) a return probability density function characterized by a power law
asymptotic behavior and (ii) a power law relaxation decay of its typical scale.
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properties of an ensemble of land prices in Japan in the 22-year period from 1981
to 2002, corresponding to the period of Japan’s bubble economy and the crashes, to
study warning phenomenon of large market crashes. We found that the tail of the
complementary cumulative distribution function of the ensemble of land prices in
the high price range is well described by a power-law distribution, P (S > x) ∼ x−α,
and furthermore, that as the power-law exponents α approached unity, the bubbles
collapsed. We reaffirmed our findings in [14]. We abstracted the land prices in the
Tokyo area from a database of the assessed value of land that is made public once a
year by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport Government of Japan,
and investigated the statistical properties of an ensemble of land prices for each
of the years in the 22-year period from 1981 to 2002, corresponding to the period
of the Japan’s bubble economy and the crashes. Figure 1(a) plots the cumulative
probability distribution of the ensembles of land prices in the four years 1985, 1987,
1991, and 1998, on the log-log scale. We found that the tail of the complementary
cumulative distribution function of the ensemble of land prices in the high price range
is described by a power-law distribution, P (S > x) ∼ x−α. We use ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression in log-log coordinates in order to determine the exponent
α for the data of land prices for each of the 22 years from 1981 - 2002. Figure 1(b)
indicates the movement of the exponent α. The exponent α continued to decrease
toward unity between 1981 and 1987, and during the period of peaks and bursts of
bubbles from 1987 to 1992, the exponent α hovered around unity. After the crashes,
the exponent α continued to increase between 1992 and 2001. This finding suggests
that the threshold value of the exponent α that cause bubbles to burst is unity∗).
The aim of this paper is to attempt to extend the observation into stock markets,
and to examine if the same as phenomena we found in bursts of the land markets
can be observed in stock market crashes. To do so, we focused our attention on the
statistical properties of ensembles of stock prices on Japan’s internet bubble (or the
dot-com bubble), ending with the bursts in 2000. Using the 1200 stocks listed and
traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for over 20 years, we formed ensembles of the
daily stock prices in the 3-year period from January 4, 1999, to December 28, 2001,
which corresponds to the period of Japan’s internet bubble and its’ crash. We found
that the tail of the complementary cumulative distribution function of the ensemble
of stock prices in the high value range is well described by a power-law distribution,
P (S > x) ∼ x−α, with an exponent that moves in the range of 1.09 < α < 1.27.
Furthermore, we found that as the power-law exponents α approached unity, the
internet bubbles collapsed. This suggests that Zipf’s law for an ensemble of the
stock prices is a sign that bubbles will burst.
∗) Yamano [15] investigated the complementary cumulative distribution of the absolute value of
year-on-year percentage changes of land prices in Japan. His work has been motivated by generalized
thermostatistics. Andersson, et. al. [16] proposed a network model of urban economy that assumed
that the market dynamics that generate land values can be represented as a growing scale-free
network.
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Fig. 1. (a) The Log-log plot of the complementary cumulative distribution P (S > x) of the land
prices’ ensembles of the Tokyo area in 1997. (b) The movement of the power-law exponent α in
the 22-year period from 1981 to 2002.
§2. The internet bubble
In the 1990s, the personal computer, software, telecommunications and inter-
net were rapidly gaining acceptance for business and personal use. Computer-
related technology drove the powerful bull market trend of global markets. Several
economists even postulated that we were in a New Economy, where inflation was
nonexistent and stock market crashes were obsolete. Investors over the world were
euphoric and believed in the fallacy of a perpetual bull market. Large scale stock
speculation occurred, causing a worldwide mania. By the late 1990s, many tech-
nology companies were selling stock in initial public offerings (IPOs). Most initial
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shareholders, including employees, became millionaires overnight. By early 2000,
reality began to sink in. Investors soon realized that the dot-com dream was really
a bubble. Within months, the Nasdaq crashed from 5,000 to 2,000. In the Japanese
stock market, many high-tech stocks which were worth billions were off the map as
quickly as they appeared, too. Panic selling ensued as investors lost trillions of dol-
lars. Numerous accounting scandals came to light, showing how many companies
had artificially inflated earnings. A lot of shareholders were crippled. Once again, we
saw the development of a bubble and the inevitable stock market crash that always
follows it.
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show the movement of the mean and variance of the stock
prices’ ensemble distribution for each day of the three-year period from January 4,
1999 to December 28, 2001. Bursting internet bubbles is explicit in the movement
of the variance rather than the movement of the mean. The variance of the stock
prices abnormally surged until the middle of 2000. The variance peaked on August
17, 2000, and dropped on December 28, 2001 by 93.3 percent. The reason why the
abnormal enlargement of the variance of stock prices occurred is probably because
capital investment was extremely concentrated on stocks of industries which were
related to the personal computer, software, telecommunications and internet, so that
the prices of a tiny number of the large, high-tech stocks surged from the beginning
of 2000.
§3. Power-law for ensembles of stock prices
Figure 3(a) shows the complementary cumulative distribution of the stock prices’
ensemble of 1,200 companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for each of the
ten days selected randomly on the log-log scale. We found that the tail of the
complementary cumulative distribution function of the stock prices’ ensemble in the
high price range is well described by a power-law distribution, P (S > x) ∼ x−α. To
confirm the robustness of the above analysis, we repeated this analysis for each of
the trading days in the 3-year period from January 4, 1999, to December 28, 2001,
which correspond to the period of Japan’s internet bubble and the collapse. Figure
3(b) shows the complementary cumulative distribution of the stock prices’ ensemble
drawn by using a whole database of stock prices of 1200 companies in the 3-year
period from January 4, 1999 to December 28, 2001. The tail of the distribution in
the high prices is also described by a power-law decay, P (S > x) ∼ x−α.
Figure 4(a) shows the movement of the power-law exponent α in the period
from January 4, 1989, to December 30, 1992. We used ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression in the log-log coordinates in order to determine the exponent α. The
power-law exponent α moved in the range of 1.08 < α < 1.27. The exponent α
continued to decrease toward unity during 1999, and the exponent α hovered around
unity during the period of the peak of bubbles in 2000. The exponent α started to
increase from the middle of 2000, when the bubbles crashed.
These results lead us to the conclusion that the power-law distribution of stock
prices’ ensemble is very strong, but the temporary ensemble distribution changes
over time. This means that the stochastic process on prices is non-stationary. Fur-
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Fig. 2. (a) The Log-log plot of the complementary cumulative distribution P (S > x) of ensembles
of the land prices of the Tokyo area in 1997. (b) The movement of the power-law exponent α
in the 22-year period from 1981 to 2002.
thermore, these findings suggest that the threshold value of the exponent α that
cause bubbles to burst is unity. We interpreted this as follows. The mean of the
power-law distribution is equal to 1/(α − 1). Therefore, as the power-law exponent
α approaches unity, the mean diverges and the bubbles inevitably collapse. From a
practical viewpoint, let us also consider the implications of these empirical findings.
The exponent α of the power-law distribution can be considered a measurement
of the price inequality. When the exponent α is equal to unity, the price inequality
in the stock market reaches a maximum. We can demonstrate this using the Gini
coefficient (G) [17], known as the index for wealth concentration. Theoretically, the
Gini coefficient ranges from zero, when all land areas are equal in price, to unity,
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Fig. 3. (a) The Log-log plot of the complementary cumulative distribution P (S > x) of ensembles
of the 1200 stock prices for each of the ten days selected randomly. (b) The complementary
cumulative distribution of stock price ensemble drawn by using a whole database of stock prices
of 1200 companies in the 3-year period from January 4, 1999 to December 28, 2001.
when one land area has the highest price and the rest none. If the exponent α
is close to unity, it means that the Gini coefficient will be close to unity. On the
other hand, the Gini coefficient can be written as G = 1/(2α − 1). Therefore, when
the power-law exponent α is equal to unity, the Gini coefficient is also equal to
unity. Figure 4(b) shows the movement of the Gini coefficient of the stock price
ensemble. The inequality of the ensemble of stock prices measured by the Gini
coefficient increased drastically from 0.58 on January 4, 1999 to 0.67 on August
18, 2000, and particularly during the final term of the internet bubble, the Gini
coefficient was nearly 70 percent, and price inequality reached the breaking point.
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Fig. 4. (a) The movement of the power-law exponent α in the 3-year period from January 4, 1999
to December 28, 2001. (b) The movement of the Gini coefficient of the stock prices S¯ in the 3
year period from January 4, 1999 to December 28, 2001.
§4. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we focused our attention on the statistical properties of ensembles
of stock prices. Using 1200 stocks traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, we formed
ensembles of daily stock prices in the period of Japan’s internet bubble. We found
that the tail of the complementary cumulative distribution function of the ensemble
in the high price range is well described by a power-law distribution, P (S > x) ∼
x−α, and when the power-law exponent α approaches unity, the bubble collapses.
These empirical findings are the same as those on the Japan’s land market crashes
in the early 1990s. The internet bubble in 2000 is defined as an extraordinary
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enlargement of the inequality of stock prices as well as Japan’s land market crash
in the early 1990s. Our findings suggest that (i) bubbles are caused by an over-
concentration of investment capital, and (ii) the stochastic dynamics of asset prices
is non-stationary, and that (iii) Zipf’s law for stock prices is an indication that
bubbles will burst. The next step is to model these findings. A theoretical study
will be conducted in the future.
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